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Abstract 
As a result of increasing globalization, people are exposed to an even greater extent to other cultures, 
making it possible for individuals to assimilate mindsets that are typical of another culture. Recent work 
on extracultural cognition has shown that immediate cultural contexts exert powerful influences on cog-
nition and behavioral patterns. This chapter reviews empirical support for extracultural cognition. Spe-
cifically, the chapter focuses on dialectical thinking and the well-established finding in the cultural liter-
ature that Westerners tend to anticipate linear continuity in the environment and East Asians anticipate 
change in existing patterns. Research shows, though, that cultural cues may shift these tendencies and—
at least temporarily—alter cognitive mindsets to reflect the cognitions of another culture. After a review 
of the literature, the chapter addresses the implications of extracultural cognition for understanding the 
influence of dialectical thinking on judgment and decision-making. 
 
Keywords: dialectical thinking, cultural context, cultural cues, extracultural cognition, judgment, decision-
making 
 
In the movie Roman Holiday (1953), runaway Princess Anne (Audrey Hepburn) and American 
journalist Joe Bradley (Gregory Peck) get swept up in the beauty and culture of Rome and 
cannot help but fall madly in love. As they are inundated with Italian culture on a scooter ride 
touring Rome, the princess and the reporter begin to adopt the passionate, fun-loving nature 
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of the Italian people. As the adage goes, “When in Rome, do as the Romans do.” In this case, 
Audrey Hepburn and Gregory Peck act Roman and take on the characteristics of the culture as 
though their worldviews had completely changed. Roman Holiday has become a classic and set 
the standard for modern romantic comedy. It also raises a question of whether culture-specific 
ways of thinking are malleable. Can being exposed to another culture change the way that 
people think and behave? 
Traditionally, cultural differences—including differences in cognition—have been viewed 
as stable over extended periods of time and resistant to change (see Hofstede & Hofstede, 2005; 
Moore & Lewis, 1952; White, 1947). Culture, by providing a context for cognition, serves as an 
important influence guiding individuals to make sense of and navigate the world around them 
(Fiske, Kitayama, Markus, & Nisbett, 1998; Heine & Norenzayan, 2006; Markus & Kitayama, 
1991; Shweder, 1990; Smith & Bond, 1993; Triandis, 1995). Traditional conceptions assume that 
these cultural differences in cognition are intracultural, meaning they are situated within a spe-
cific cultural context, and an implication of this is that people outside of the culture do not 
adopt them. 
Today, with increasing globalization, people are exposed to an even greater extent to other 
cultures. Consequently, these traditional conceptions of culture may no longer hold. People 
are increasingly exposed to and experience other cultures, making it possible for individuals 
to assimilate mindsets that are typical of another culture. Recent work on extracultural cogni-
tion has shown that immediate cultural contexts exert powerful influences on cognition and 
behavioral patterns. European Americans, for instance, may adopt cognitive mindsets (e.g., a 
dialectical thinking style) typically associated with the Chinese in the presence of a salient Chi-
nese cultural symbol or context (Alter & Kwan, 2009). 
In this chapter, we discuss and review empirical support for the idea that cultural world-
views can be temporally malleable to the extent that the immediate environment conveys al-
ternative cultural worldviews. While a well-established finding is that Westerners tend to an-
ticipate linear continuity in the environment and East Asians are more likely to anticipate 
change in existing patterns, cultural cues may shift these tendencies and—at least temporar-
ily—alter cognitive mindsets to reflect the cognitions of another culture. This chapter consists 
of three main parts. First, we will introduce the literature on dialectical and nondialectical (oth-
erwise termed “linear”) cognition. This section is not intended to be a comprehensive review 
of the previous studies on dialectical cognition; rather, it is intended to provide a concise over-
view of the topic. Interested readers should refer to chapter 1 and other chapters in this volume 
for a detailed discussion of this literature. Second, we will focus our attention on extracultural 
cognition (i.e., the ways people can express the worldviews of other cultures). In this section, 
we discuss recent research on the topic, including current research from our lab. Third, we 
discuss a number of implications and identify future directions for extracultural cognition re-
search in the final section of the chapter. 
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Dialectical versus Nondialectical Cognition 
 
Nondialectical cognition has a long lineage in Western history and is evident even in ancient 
Greece (Peng & Nisbett, 1999). Parmenides—an ancient Greek philosopher from around 510–
450 BCE who had a large impact on Western philosophy—in his famous poem, “On Nature,” 
argues that things do not change (Ji, Nisbett, & Su, 2001). According to Parmenides, existence 
is timeless and uniform, and nothing can emerge from nothingness, thus it has always existed. 
Western philosophy embraced this linear view of nature, and it can been seen in the ridged 
structure of philosophical arguments that reinforce a perception that each cause creates an ef-
fect, and all effects are inherently tied to a cause. This is a direct expression of the belief that 
there is a direct, linear relationship between events. Even the Western view of utopia is built 
on the idea that we are steadily rising toward creating the perfect society, which we will then 
maintain, unchanged, for eternity (Ji et al., 2001). The future is perceived as being on a fixed, 
linear path upward without deviation in its direction. 
As described in these cultural examples, Western nondialectal or “linear” thinking is char-
acterized by a preference for consistency and lack of change. When change does occur, it is 
thought to progress in a linear, consistent direction not deviating from its original path. In 
nondialectical thinking, contradictions are considered unacceptable and, according to the rules 
of logic, one side of the contradiction must be deemed correct. There is little attempt to tolerate 
the contradiction, nor are Westerners likely to see truth in both perspectives. As such, Western 
nondialectical thinking is in constant pursuit of a single truth, and emphasis is placed on the 
construction of counterarguments when scrutinizing the correctness of two competing propo-
sitions. 
Traditional Chinese philosophy is exemplified in the I Ching, or Book of Changes, which dis-
cusses how the world changes from one extreme to another. The moon waxes and wanes. Sum-
mer becomes fall, which becomes winter, which becomes spring, and then becomes summer 
again. According to this philosophy, energy keeps moving and the spirit keeps changing. This 
constant change and the coexistence of opposites are the essence of the yin and yang principle. 
Even the Confucian principle of utopia reflects a U-shaped life model (Ji et al., 2001). According 
to this philosophy, the golden time was in the past, to which we will return in the future. 
East Asian philosophy suggests that there are three principles associated with dialecticism 
(Nisbett, Peng, Choi, & Norenzayan, 2001; Peng & Nisbett, 1999). The first is the principle of 
change. Reality is seen as a process that is dynamic and changeable, rather than static. Because 
nature and life are fluid, people and things are seen as capable of morphing rather than re-
maining constant. Second is the principle of contradiction. Because change is constant, contra-
diction is constant. Good and bad, new and old, up and down are dependent on one another 
for their existence. As part of this belief, it is possible for opposites to exist simultaneously 
within the same state of affairs. Based on this principle, two competing ideas are seen as both 
containing truth instead of being in direct contradiction with one another. A corollary is that 
East Asian philosophy focuses on finding a “middle road” to resolve conflicts rather than find-
ing truth in one perspective over another. Third is the principle of relationship or holism. Be-
cause there is constant change and contradiction, nothing in nature and life is isolated and 
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independent. Because everything is related, trying to extrapolate elements from the larger 
whole can be misleading and erroneous. 
 
Cross-Cultural Differences between Dialectical and Linear Thinking 
Researchers have examined how dialectical and nondialectical tendencies in East Asian and 
Western cultures influence cognition. In this section, we discuss some of the notable findings 
from this literature. First, we consider the area of decision-making and predictions about future 
trends based on information about past trends. East Asians are more likely to predict changes 
in trends—including reversals in the direction of the trend—whereas Westerners are more 
likely to expect the continuation of the same trend (for a detailed review, see Chapter 3 in this 
volume). According to one study, when presented with graphs showing various trends for 
statistics over time, such as cancer death rates or global economic growth, Westerners made 
more predictions consistent with the given trends than East Asians. In contrast, East Asians 
made more predictions that deviated from the given trends than did Westerners, and they 
were more likely to predict a reversal in the trend, such that the slope actually changed direc-
tion (Ji et al., 2001). 
Other research paradigms have provided East Asian and Western participants with various 
graphs depicting stock trends and then asked whether the participants would buy the stock or 
keep the stock if told they already own it (Alter & Kwan, 2009; Ji, Zhang, & Guo, 2008). The 
results show that Westerners are more likely to buy stocks and keep them when there are in-
creasing or stable trends, whereas East Asians are more likely to buy or keep stock when there 
is a decreasing trend. When asked to explain their decisions, Westerners argued that the future 
price of the stock would follow the same trend (Ji et al., 2008). In contrast, East Asians were 
more likely to argue that the price would probably go in the opposite direction. Another ver-
sion of this study found the same effects even among experienced stock investors (Ji et al., 
2008). 
Future predictions have also been examined in the context of one’s own happiness. In the 
study by Ji and colleagues (2001), participants were provided with a number of different graph-
ically depicted trend lines and asked to pick which best represented their happiness through-
out their lifetime. Westerners were more likely to endorse a linear trend that showed they ex-
pected their happiness to continue in the same direction at an even pace. East Asian 
participants were more likely to endorse a nonlinear trend line and were twice as likely as 
Westerners to endorse a U-shaped trend. These findings show that, for East Asians, happiness 
and unhappiness can transform into each other following a cyclical route. Findings such as 
these regarding predictions of future events suggest that Westerners may be more likely to 
commit the “hot hands fallacy” (Ji et al., 2008). This is the mistaken belief that past success in a 
random event will predict future success, such as when a sports player is thought to be doing 
well—he has “hot hands”—thus people predict the success streak will continue. Conversely, 
East Asians are more likely to commit the “gambler’s fallacy” (Ji et al., 2008). This is the mis-
taken belief that random events going one direction, such as a coin being tossed heads repeat-
edly, will turn around and start going the other direction. 
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East Asians and Westerners also differ in their perceptions of themselves and others as a 
result of differences in cognitive style. Research on the perceptions of the self has shown that 
although coherence in one’s sense of self is important and possibly universal, there are cultural 
differences in how people achieve this goal (Spencer-Rodgers, Boucher, Mori, Wang, & Peng, 
2009). Westerners tend to strive for internal consistency so that opposing qualities do not sim-
ultaneously exist within the individual. In contrast, East Asian cultures seem to strive more for 
equilibrium, or a balancing of opposing characteristics (Spencer-Rodgers et al., 2009). 
When it comes to perceptions of others, Westerners often display what is termed the funda-
mental attribution error—the tendency to make internal attributions when evaluating the behav-
ior of others—a phenomenon that was once thought to be universal (Morris & Peng, 1994). 
Cultural studies have shown, however, that East Asians are less likely to make internal, or 
dispositional, attributions than are Westerners (Choi, Nisbett, & Norenzayan, 1999). For exam-
ple, one study found that an English-language newspaper reporting on an incident involving 
multiple murders used more personal dispositions, or internal attributions, to explain the 
crime than a Chinese-language newspaper, which used more situational factors, or external 
attributions, when reporting on a similar crime (Morris & Peng, 1994). 
As mentioned earlier, one of the principles of dialectical thinking is that of contradiction. 
Opposites exist in the same object or event and depend on one another for their existence. 
Without sadness, we would not know happiness. This principle has been reflected in a number 
of interesting differences observed in how East Asians and Westerners process conflict. When 
resolving conflicts, East Asians are more likely to try to find a “middle road” or compromise 
rather than choose a “correct” side (Peng & Nisbett, 1999). They are also more focused on ad-
dressing both sides of the issue. In contrast, Westerners are more likely to find fault with one 
side or the other and are less likely to search for a compromise. This was tested in both a social 
context, such as a mother and daughter fighting, and a scientific context, such as when two 
studies provide contradictory findings. 
 
Research on Within-Culture Variation 
Although a vast majority of the research has focused on cross-cultural differences in dialectical 
cognition, evidence also suggests that there is within-culture variation. The capacity to think 
dialectically exists across cultures but depends on a number of factors, including age and other 
situational influences, such as life experience. For instance, cross-cultural variations in beliefs 
about change are not robust at every age. Research on the development of dialectical thinking 
shows that at the age of 7, East Asian and Western children predicted similar amounts of 
change in a number of domains, but by age 11, Chinese children made significantly more dia-
lectal predictions (Ji, 2008). This finding suggests that dialectical cognition increases as children 
learn and master the relevant cultural theory. Other research also has shown that older indi-
viduals tend to exhibit more dialectical thinking than that of young and middle-aged people. 
For example, older individuals tend to emphasize the need for taking multiple perspectives 
and finding a compromising “middle road” when dealing with intergroup and interpersonal 
conflict (Grossmann et al., 2010). Furthermore, Baltes and Staudinger (1993) have demon-
strated that older individuals and those in the helping professions (e.g., clinical psychologists, 
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pastoral counselors, legal specialists in marriage and family matters) tend to think more dia-
lectically because they have had more life experiences. Having a broader knowledge base of 
human experience to draw from means that people are more likely to generate counterexamples. 
Research also suggests that dialectical thinking varies within cultures (Choi, Koo, & Choi, 
2007; Spencer-Rodgers et al., 2009. Choi, Koo, and Choi (2007) found that Korean participants 
differed in their scores on the Analysis-Holism Scale, depending on whether they were stu-
dents of Oriental medicine or other medical fields (for a review, see chapter 4 in this volume). 
Koreans studying Oriental medicine show greater holistic beliefs compared to Koreans study-
ing other medical fields. Spencer-Rodgers and colleagues also find substantial within-culture 
variation in people’s responses on the Dialectical Self Scale (for a review, see Spencer-Rodgers 
et al., 2009), Research also has shown differences in dialectical thinking that are based on social 
class within cultures. For example, Grossmann and Varnum (2010) showed that Americans 
with lower socioeconomic status backgrounds exhibit more dialectical thinking. Working class 
individuals attend more to the context, use less linear reasoning about change, and make less 




As our brief review of the cross-cultural literature shows, Westerners and East Asians differ in 
the extent to which they display dialectical cognition, among other cultural differences. The 
traditional view is that these cultural differences are largely stable. Changes in cultural beliefs 
are thought to be relatively infrequent, and when change does happen, it is slow to occur. An 
essential part of this conceptualization of culture is that cognition is intracultural, meaning that 
it is situated within a particular culturally bound context. Thus, one must be immersed within 
a cultural context to psychologically experience and express the cognitions and worldviews of 
that culture. Yet, research with bicultural individuals suggests that people can shift cultural 
perspectives and that this process is largely automatic (e.g., Hong, Morris, Chiu, & Benet-Mar-
tínez, 2000; Wan, Chiu, Peng, & Tam, 2007; Wong & Hong, 2005). One study showed that bi-
cultural Westernized Hong Kong Chinese participants, when primed with either American or 
Chinese culturally laden icons, shifted their attributional style. They resembled monocultural 
Americans when primed with an American flag and monocultural Chinese people when 
primed with a Chinese dragon (e.g., Hong et al., 2000). Findings like these suggest that bicul-
turals do not have a single cognitive style. Rather, they are capable of shifting between various 
cognitive styles—such as dialectical versus nondialectical thinking—depending on which cul-
ture is most salient in a given situation. The developmental literature on dialectical thinking 
also suggests that cognitive style is something that is learned instead of innate (Ji, 2008). If 
children do not display dialectical cognition until about the age of 11, then, presumably, it is 
something acquired from socialization. This suggests that shifts in cultural cognition are pos-
sible as one’s dominant cultural environment changes. 
If bicultural individuals are capable of shifting their cultural perspectives because of their 
access to two cultural worldviews, and cultural cognition is learned rather than innate, then 
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logically, individuals exposed to varied cultural perspectives should be able to adopt the cog-
nition of those cultures (Alter & Kwan, 2009; Kwan, Li, White, & Jacobson, 2015). Consider for 
a moment the world that we live in. A world that was once perceived as incomprehensively 
large has shrunk considerably with the advent of modern technology. In about 11 hours, it is 
now possible to fly from Los Angeles, California to Tokyo, Japan. With a few clicks of a com-
puter mouse, one can video chat with someone on the other side of the world. Within a matter 
of minutes a person can find television, movies, books, and music on the Internet from nearly 
every country around the globe. The world now has affordable international travel, globalized 
commerce, and the Internet, and the evidence indicates that people are taking advantage of 
these opportunities. In many ways, for the first time in the history of humankind, we have 
become part of a “global village” (McLuhan, 1962). 
As people are increasingly exposed to diverse cultures, it follows that this exposure in-
creases their knowledge and understanding of those cultures. In addition, it is possible that as 
people are exposed to foreign cultures, they internalize certain aspects of those cultures. Using 
this logic as our foundation, we argue that it is possible for people to display extracultural cog-
nition. In other words, cultural worldviews can be temporarily malleable to the extent that the 
environment conveys alternative cultural worldviews. The next section will explore current 
research findings that support this theory. 
 
Empirical Evidence of Extracultural Cognition: Recent Research 
Early empirical work has shown that cultural values are malleable and can be activated 
through priming. One area of research demonstrated that people could be induced to exhibit 
either an individualist or collectivistic mindset (for a review, see Oyserman & Lee, 2007). For 
example Gardner, Gabriel, and Lee (1999) induced Western and East Asian participants to 
adopt independent or interdependent mindsets by having participants read a passage and cir-
cle words like I or me (to prime independence) and words like us or we (to prime interdepend-
ence). They found that participants tended to endorse individualistic values when primed with 
independence, and collectivistic values when primed with interdependence. 
Cultural researchers have also primed dialectical thinking. For example, Spencer-Rodgers, 
Peng, Wang, and Hou (2004) primed dialectical thinking by asking both European American 
and Chinese participants to think about and describe ambivalent experiences that had both 
positive and negative consequences for the self. They found that both the European Americans 
and the Chinese in the prime condition scored higher on dialecticism than those in the control 
condition. Another study primed dialectical thinking using fabricated scientific articles illus-
trating the importance of dialectical thinking (Ma-Kellams, Spencer-Rodgers, & Peng, 2010). 
Taking this premise a step further, Alter and Kwan (2009) demonstrated that dialectical 
thinking could be activated using culturally laden stimuli and physical environments that 
brought to mind the cognitive style, without having to directly prime the cultural concepts per 
se. In a series of studies examining extracultural dialectical cognition, Alter and Kwan first 
showed that the immediate physical environment could induce European Americans to think 
more dialectically. European Americans in Chinatown in New York City, who presumably had 
been exposed to East Asian worldviews, predicted more change in the weather than did their 
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counterparts on the Upper East Side of Manhattan, who presumably were monocultural. In a 
second study examining the influence of the environment on dialectical thinking, European 
Americans who were entering or exiting an American or an Asian supermarket (the environ-
mental manipulation) completed a questionnaire asking them to hypothetically invest $1,000 
in various appreciating and depreciating stocks. If the cultural products in the Asian super-
market were activating dialectical thinking, then, the theory argued, European Americans par-
ticipants exiting the Asian supermarket should show more dialectical thinking, relative to 
those entering the Asian supermarket or those shopping at the American supermarket. Again, 
the results supported the prediction that dialectical thinking can be induced by the immediate 
cultural context. Participants exiting the Asian supermarket exhibited dialectical thinking: they 
expected greater change and they invested less in previously appreciating stocks than did par-
ticipants in the other three conditions. 
Alter and Kwan’s (2009) remaining studies showed that dialectical thinking could also be 
primed by merely using culturally laden stimuli. Employing the same paradigm in which Eu-
ropean Americans were asked to hypothetically invest $1,000 in various stocks, Alter and Kwan 
showed that participants primed with the yin-yang symbol expected greater change and in-
vested less in previously appreciating stocks than did those who were presented with control 
primes, and this effect was stronger the more familiar the individuals were with the cultural 
symbol. These findings were replicated in another study that showed that when European 
Americans were primed with the yin-yang symbol, they anticipated significantly more rain 
following a sunny trend than did control participants. However, participants shown a rainy 
trend were not significantly more likely to predict sun than the control group. Taken together, 
these findings suggest that priming participants with the yin-yang symbol may induce a more 
cautious thinking style (a greater likelihood of anticipating a negative event than a positive 
event). Future studies should examine this possibility. 
In another study reported by Alter and Kwan (2009), they showed that even experts in a 
field relevant to the predictions can be influenced by cultural priming. In this study, they used 
the paradigm of asking participants to hypothetically invest $1,000 in the stock market, but 
instead of using lay people, who have little or no experience in this domain and thus are more 
susceptible to cognitive biases, they asked Wall Street professionals to complete the study. 
Even experts were influenced by the same cultural priming and exhibited the same dialectical 
mindset when primed with the yin-yang symbol. Furthermore, the authors found that Euro-
pean Americans who had recently spent time overseas were more influenced by the cultural 
priming in their decision-making. This finding reinforces the idea that exposure to foreign cul-
tures and the advent of the “global village” give rise to extracultural cognition. It is also note-
worthy that the priming studies had this effect with very subtle primes that varied in the stud-
ies. In some studies, the symbol was on the back of the clipboard held by the experimenter; in 
others, it was on the questionnaire letterhead; and in another, it was on a T-shirt worn by the 
experimenter. 
Other research has applied the concept of extracultural cognition to individuals’ health sta-
tus predictions and willingness to engage in health-promoting behavior (Kim & Kwan, 2013; 
for a review on dialectical thinking and physical health, see Chapter 15 in this volume). In one 
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study, European American participants were primed with either cyclical or linear beliefs about 
change, and the researchers measured whether or not the individual expected to contract the 
flu in the following year. Compared to those primed with linear beliefs, those primed with 
dialectical cyclical beliefs thought they were more likely to contract the flu in the upcoming flu 
season. However, recent flu history moderated the results and the effect was observed only 
among people who had not suffered from the flu in the previous year. Furthermore, whether 
someone had recently had the flu and the dialectical thinking prime interacted to influence 
whether the participants intended to receive the flu vaccine in the upcoming flu season. For 
those who had been sick with the flu the previous year, those primed with dialectical cyclical 
beliefs predicted a lower likelihood of their seeking a flu vaccine than those primed with linear 
beliefs. This is congruent with the cyclical expectation that if one contracted the flu the previous 
year, then one would not get the flu this year, thus there would be no reason to get the flu shot. 
Of those who had not had the flu in the previous year, there was no significant difference be-
tween the conditions. One implication of this research is that people’s health beliefs and pre-
vention efforts can be influenced by dialectical thinking, which can be primed, possibly through 
public health campaigns. 
 
Implications and Future Directions 
 
In this chapter, we have highlighted that there are cross-cultural and within-cultural differences 
in dialectical thinking. More importantly, we have argued for and cited research supporting 
the idea that cultural groups have become a part of a “global village” and thus extracultural 
cognition exists. Because of exposure to a variety of cultures, people can adopt the cognitive 
styles of other cultures when in environments that make those cultures salient, such as being 
in an Asian grocery store or being exposed to culturally laden icons. Demonstrating that cog-
nitive styles are malleable can have important implications for our understanding of culture 
and judgment and decision-making. The following sections discuss some of these implications 
and areas for future research on this topic. 
 
International Business 
As our world has moved more toward becoming a “global village,” international business has 
dramatically increased (International Monetary Fund, 2002). It is now common for businesses 
to deal with other businesses throughout the world, forging contractual agreements and part-
nerships across cultural boundaries. The business world has acknowledged cultural differences, 
and research has examined how it influences processes such as negotiations (see Smith, Bond, 
& Kagitcibasi, 2006). Nevertheless, little research has examined how the environment and 
merely being present in another culture can influence one’s negotiating tactics, goals, and eval-
uations of the situation. As demonstrated by Alter and Kwan (2009), simply being exposed to 
a different cultural environment can induce someone to be more dialectical, and this could 
have interesting implications for international business. 
Imagine being an American businessperson negotiating a deal in China. While in China, 
your environment would display a culture with which you are somewhat familiar but which 
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is not your own (e.g., one that emphasizes dialectical thinking). If extracultural cognition is 
operating, then it is conceivable that there would be changes in your negotiation strategy. For 
example, you might become more compromising and willing to find a “middle road” solution 
rather than adhering firmly to your initial demands. You also might be more amenable to change, 
which could influence the flexibility of the terms of the contract. In short, even if everything 
else is identical, except the location, the deal created in China might be very different from the 
one negotiated in America. Without more research, it is difficult to say whether extracultural 
cognition would provide an advantage for one culture over the other or whether the effects 
could be countered by having individuals based in the home culture oversee the negotiation 
process. We view this as an area that is ripe for further research. 
 
Dispute Resolution 
Dispute resolution in the American legal system has long been adversarial in nature, although 
a shift has started to emerge, emphasizing nonadversarial mechanisms, such as mediation, 
over traditional mechanisms (e.g. Kagan, 2001). This shift is being encouraged, in part, to de-
crease the use of the scarce resources of the judicial system, both monetary and time resources. 
Other cultures have generally preferred nonadversarial mechanisms. For example, the Chinese 
have a strong preference for mediating and bargaining, based on the perception that these pro-
cedures decrease animosity between disputants (Leung, 1987). This is congruent with dialecti-
cism, which emphasizes considering both sides of an argument to come to a “middle road” 
agreement (Peng & Nisbett, 1999). In contrast, Americans tend to strongly prefer adversarial 
dispute mechanisms, which are consistent with the analytical principle of finding the one, right 
answer to any issue (Peng & Nisbett, 1999). 
Can extracultural exposure influence people’s preference for nonadversarial dispute reso-
lution? To the extent that cognition is malleable in this context, it might be possible to prime 
people with the principle of contradiction, thus encouraging them to be more amenable to non-
adversarial mechanisms, such as mediation. If individuals were willing to resolve their differ-
ences outside of the courtroom, in a less costly manner, this could save valuable time and resources. 
Research is needed to examine the influence of cultural priming on people’s willingness to use 
and satisfaction with nonadversarial dispute resolution mechanisms. 
 
Coping with Disasters 
Disasters—whether natural, like hurricane Katrina in 2005 and the Tohoku earthquake in 2011, 
or manmade, like the Deepwater Horizon oil spill in 2010—can have devastating and lasting 
effects on the local population and their environment. In these situations, there is considerable 
concern regarding the affected population’s ability to cope and move on after the disaster. In-
dividuals who are high in dialectical thinking may be better able to cope flexibly and recover 
faster from disasters because of their acceptance of change (for a review of dialectical thinking 
and coping, see chapter 20 in this volume). To the extent that people see the potential for good 
to come out of difficult situations, they will maintain an optimistic outlook and seek opportu-
nities to create a positive future. Negative events ultimately are perceived as creating favorable 
outcomes. 
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If a dialectical mindset encourages flexible coping and forward, positive thinking (Cheng, 
2009), then using extracultural cognition to encourage this mindset could be beneficial during 
disasters. For example, the media could be used to prime beliefs about change and contradic-
tion, providing individuals with the hope necessary to move forward after the disaster. An 
emerging literature has addressed how people react to and cope in the aftermath of disasters 
(e.g., Greening, Dollinger, & Pitz, 1996; Suls, Rose, Windschitl, & Smith, 2013; Tierney, Lindell, 
& Perry, 2001; Trumbo, Lueck, Marlatt, & Peek, 2011), but little is known about factors that 
affect disaster preparedness, such as social cognitive processes that influence perceptions of 
and reactions to impending disasters (Kwan & White, 2014). Therefore, an interesting direction 
for future research would be to examine how beliefs about change in these types of situations 
influences perceptions of the disaster and people’s ability to cope and move forward with their 
lives. Extracultural cognition also may have important implications for emotion regulation, 
mental health, and physical health (see chapters 18, 19, and 20, respectively, in this volume for 
a discussion on how dialectical thinking influences these domains). 
 
Punishment and Rehabilitation 
One interesting implication of extracultural cognition is its potential to influence beliefs about 
punishment and rehabilitation by influencing people’s attributions. Research examining indi-
vidual’s thoughts regarding punishing criminals has suggested that individuals who make more 
internal attributions about crime are more punitive and less in favor of rehabilitation (e.g., Cul-
len, Clark, Cullen, & Mathers, 1985; Sims, 2003). Previous research also has shown that West-
erners are far more likely to make dispositional attributions for others’ behaviors than are East 
Asians (Choi, Nisbett, & Norenzayan, 1999). But if one can influence others to make more sit-
uational attributions, they may change their beliefs about punishment and endorse providing 
criminals with second chances. If people believe that circumstances are influential in a person’s 
decision to commit a crime, they will be less likely to believe that the offender will commit the 
same crime in the future. They attribute the cause more to the situation, and since circum-
stances are constantly changing, it is unlikely that the wrongdoer will be in the same situation 
in the future. Thus, people who make situational attributions are more willing to consider mit-
igating circumstances, be more lenient toward criminals, and be more inclined to give wrong-
doers a second chance. Dialectical thinkers also may regard rehabilitation as a worthwhile en-
deavor and favor criminal justice systems that incorporate rehabilitative components, such as 
compulsory community service, psychotherapy, and anger management courses. 
In sum, these beliefs can have a large impact on the individual wrongdoer, since juries and 
judges who make the decisions about criminal responsibility and sentencing are affected by 
their cognitive styles. To the extent trial lawyers are able to encourage dialectical cyclical think-
ing—especially during closing arguments, which is closest to the time decisions are made—
they might be able to influence the judge or jurors to make more external attributions and favor 
lighter sentencing or rehabilitative programs. Likewise, policymakers who set the sentencing 
guidelines and control the prison system could also be swayed through their cognitive mindsets. 
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Global Climate Change 
Some argue that global climate change is one of the biggest issues the world is currently facing 
and will continue to face unless large-scale action is undertaken in the near future (Epstein & 
Ferber, 2011). Yet, many are skeptical about the influence of human activity on global climate 
change and our ability to correct the problem. Some researchers have begun investigating the 
importance of cultural norms and values on whether or not people believe global climate 
change is occurring and is caused by humans. For example, Kahan, Jenkins-Smith, and Braman 
(2011), in a U.S. sample, examined the influence of egalitarian beliefs and individualism on 
whether people thought experts agree on climate change issues. They found that among indi-
viduals who were high in egalitarianism and collectivism, 78% thought that most experts agree 
that global temperatures are increasing and 68% thought that most experts agree that humans 
are causing the warming. In contrast, among individuals who were more hierarchal and indi-
vidualist, only 19% thought most experts agree that global temperatures are increasing and 
only 12% thought most experts agree that humans are causing the warming. 
Thinking about this issue from the perspective of dialectical versus nondialectical (or “lin-
ear”) cognition also could have important implications for beliefs about global climate change 
and people’s willingness to work toward solutions. However, dialectical thinking may not have 
a beneficial influence on this topic. For example, one could make the prediction that, from a 
dialectical perspective, all things in nature are constantly in flux and changing. Thus, dialecti-
cal thinkers might see the world as being in a cycle of warming and cooling and thus be more 
likely to see global climate change as a natural occurrence that will shift until it returns to its 
previous state. If so, they might be reluctant to take measures to combat global climate change 
because they believe that the problem will eventually correct itself. 
Nondialectical (or linear) thinking, however, may not be beneficial, either. If people tend to 
see the world as constant and unchanging, then they may feel powerless to do anything about 
global climate change. If they believe that, regardless of the course of action, things will remain 
the same or continue to deteriorate, then action will seem futile. An interesting and worthwhile 
area of future research would be to examine how dialectical and nondialectical cognition in-
fluences people’s perceived ability to change the environment, such as with global climate 
change. If we understand how cognitive strategies influence perceptions and behavior in this 
context, it might be possible to encourage people to adopt a useful course of action, using cul-
tural priming. For example, it might be possible to increase the belief that humans can have a 
positive impact on global climate change, by emphasizing that global climate change is largely 
manmade, while priming dialectical thinking. In doing so, people should feel more capable of 
reducing their own greenhouse gas-producing behaviors. 
 
Priming Linear Thinking in East Asians 
The research discussed on extracultural cognition in this chapter has focused on priming dia-
lectical thinking in Westerners. However, just as Westerners are increasingly exposed to East 
Asian culture through globalization, East Asians are also exposed to Western culture. This 
means that East Asians could be primed to think more linearly through exposure to Western 
symbols and environments, and this could have important implications for our understanding 
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of culture and judgment and decision-making. For example, East Asians who receive a Western-
influenced college education are trained in formal logic and tend to think more linearly (Spencer-
Rodgers et al., 2009). As previously mentioned, Choi, Koo, and Choi (2007) examined the think-
ing styles of Korean students who were receiving either a formal university education in Ori-
ental medicine or other more Westernized majors. Arguably, students receiving a Westernized 
education are likely influenced to think more linearly, compared to those receiving a tradi-
tional Oriental-styled education. Choi and colleagues found that students who received a more 
Westernized education displayed a more linear thinking style than that of their counterparts. 
Few studies have examined the effects of experimentally priming linear thinking in East 
Asians (Ma-Kellams et al., 2010). Ma-Kellams and colleagues primed linear thinking among 
Chinese students at the University of California, Berkeley, and found that participants exhib-
ited a more Westernized form of group perception (i.e., less ambivalent ingroup attitudes). 
Priming linear thinking among East Asians is an area ripe for future research that could have 
important implications for our understanding of cultural differences and how to navigate those 
differences in an increasingly interactive global community. For example, priming linear think-
ing in East Asians could benefit intercultural communication and contact. In priming East Asians 
with linear thinking, they might be better able to perform critical perspective taking, which is 
important as people interact more frequently with other cultures. This could help improve 
business relations between Western and East Asian companies and promote better under-
standing in joint cultural efforts, such as relief work, improving international trade, and coping 
with and reducing global warming. 
Another interesting direction for future research is to examine how strongly foreign cultural 
contexts influence cognition among different populations. Previous studies have shown that 
people from one culture may infuse their judgments with the tenets of a second salient culture, 
as long as they recognize the meaning embodied in that culture. The biculturalism literature 
suggests that immigrants rapidly become competent with their adopted culture, thus, for ex-
ample, Asian expatriates who live for an extended period of time in a foreign culture may be 
more susceptible to foreign cultural primes than their counterparts who visit that culture for a 




In this chapter, we have argued that, as the world has become a “global village” people have 
internalized aspects of other cultures, which are brought to mind when the environment makes 
that culture salient—a process referred to as extracultural cognition. Research has shown that it 
is possible to encourage people to think more dialectically by varying their environment, for 
example, by being in an Asian supermarket or being presented with culturally laden symbols, 
such as the yin-yang symbol. We also discussed a number of implications of this priming effect, 
although the list is by no means exhaustive. What is clear from our discussion is that the field 
is ripe for further investigation on the impact of extracultural cognition. There are still many 
questions to be answered. For example, more research is needed to explore the boundary con-
ditions of extracultural cognition or the conditions under which it is most effective. What the 
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research does show is that, although cultural cognition was once thought to be stable and dif-
ficult to change, there is now evidence that it is malleable. Hopefully, these findings will en-
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